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Abstract
Human beings are endowed with a unique motivation to be included in social interactions. This natural social motivation, in
turn, is thought to encourage behaviours such as flattery or self-deprecation aimed to ease interaction and to enhance the
reputation of the individual who produces them. If this is the case, diminished social interest should affect reputation
management. Here, we use Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) –primarily characterised by pervasive social disinterest– as a
model to investigate the effect of social motivation on reputation management. Children first rated a set of pictures and
were then given the opportunity to inflate their initial ratings in front of an experimenter who declared that she had drawn
the picture. Contrary to the controls, children with ASD did not enhance their ratings in the drawer’s presence. Moreover,
participants’ flattery behaviour correlated with self-reports of social enjoyment. Our findings point to a link between
diminished social interest and reputation management.
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Introduction
The intensity of cooperative activities is a defining feature of our
species’ ecological niche. Trading, hunting, gathering, and all
other types of collective actions give access to benefits that would
have otherwise remained beyond our limits. As a consequence of
this evolutionary history, the drive to be included in the most
fruitful cooperative ventures is central to human psychology [1].
Two intertwined psychological dispositions are of special impor-
tance in this respect: the motivation to engage in social interactions
and the ability to present oneself as a likable partner in these
interactions. Failure to achieve either of these goals might result in
being isolated, thereby loosing the potential benefits of cooperation
(for experimental evidence, see e.g. [2]). As a result, most people
exhibit clear signs that they find social interactions rewarding and
that they therefore care about their reputation.
Concern for reputation is mostly expressed through ingratiating
behaviours, such as downward self-presentation (e.g., apology,
modesty, self-deprecation) and other-enhancement (e.g., flattery).
These behaviours aim to elicit positive attitudes in the recipient,
thereby enhancing the reputation of the ingratiator. A substantial
amount of theory and empirical data suggests that flattery is one of
the most powerful forms of ingratiation and that it is an effective
means of producing positive effects in the target (e.g., perceived
likeability, perceived competency, hiring decisions, tipping, pay
raises, and so on); for a meta-analytic review of 69 studies, see [3],
see also [4]. It is important to note that, as suggested by Jones and
Wortman [5], ‘‘ingratiating overtures are rarely the result of
conscious or deliberate tactical planning’’. Rather, ingratiation
should be seen as a spontaneous bias, a natural propensity to try
and enhance one’s image in front of others, without necessarily
consciously aiming to do so.
Ingratiation in children is less well documented but there is
evidence that children as young as 2 to 3 years of age
spontaneously engage in strategies of self-enhancement. For
instance, they share their successes with others more frequently
than they share their failures [6] and they present themselves in
overly positive lights when describing their conflicts with siblings
[7]. In preschool years, children also become able to engage in
relatively subtle forms of pro-social lies, like, for instance, telling an
experimenter that they look good for a picture when they have in
fact a conspicuous mark of lipstick on the nose [8]. They can also
mask a disappointed emotional expression in the presence of an
experimenter who gives them an undesirable gift [9], or declare
that they are happy with an undesirable gift for politeness purposes
[10]. Later on in development (at about 7 to 9 years of age),
children become able to acknowledge explicitly that politeness
sometimes trumps honesty [11].
If social motivation underlies reputation management, then one
would predict reduced or absent ingratiation, flattery and other
types of ‘social grooming’ in individuals with diminished social
interest. In autism spectrum disorders (ASD), social motivation is
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earliest symptoms of ASD [12,13,14,15] and is believed by many
to be the primary deficit in autism [12,16,17]. Numerous studies,
using a variety of techniques, have demonstrated a lack of
preferential attention for social stimuli: preference for non social
contingencies over biological motion [13], for non-speech signals
over motherese [18], and for objects over people [15,19,20]. Social
engagement is also markedly decreased in ASD: The earliest signs
of autism include a decreased response to one’s own name [21],
diminished orientation to social stimuli in general [15], rare
sharing gestures such as pointing or showing [22], and, later on in
development, fewer responses to others’ bids for joint attention
[23] and diminished interest in collaborative activities [24].
To test the links between social motivation and reputation
management, we used a simple paradigm in which participants are
given the opportunity to flatter another person: Recent findings by
Fu and Lee [25] indicate that 4- to 6-year-olds spontaneously
improve their rating of a drawing in the presence of the artist,
demonstrating their command of other-enhancement strategies.
Aside from its simplicity and ecological value, this task was chosen
because there is evidence that it truly targets flattery behaviours. In
a follow-up experiment using the same procedure, Fu and Lee
indeed demonstrated that 6-year-olds enhance their ratings to a
greater extent for individuals with whom they are likely to interact
in the future than for those they are uncertain to encounter again.
This pattern of results thus carries the signature of flattery, which
as the authors argue, ‘‘is effective for maintaining and enhancing
existing relationships’’ (p. 261). In this paper, we concentrated on
whether adolescent with ASD improve their rating of a drawing in
the presence or absence of the artist using Fu and Lee’s original
setting. We predicted that, unlike typically developing children,
children with ASD would not be prone to this flattery bias, and
would not alter their ratings to please the artist. We further
hypothesized that flattery scores (positive change in picture ratings)
would correlate with an independent measure of social enjoyment.
Methods
Ethics statement
The procedure was approved by the local ethics committee
(PNM/09/10-8, Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics
Sub-Committee,King’s College London). Parents of all partici-
pants gave their written informed consent prior to our coming to
the school and children gave informed assent prior to the
beginning of the procedure.
Participants
Thirty-six male adolescents (18 with ASD and 18 Typically
Developing, henceforth TD) took part in the study. The ASD and
the control groups were matched on chronological age and IQ, as
assessed with the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, two-
subtest form [26] (see Table 1). Children in the ASD group were
recruited from special education schools or unit. All had received a
formal diagnosis of an ASD by an independent clinician,
according to the standard Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders-IV criteria (APA, 1994) and all were high
functioning. Eleven participants had received a diagnosis of
Asperger Syndrome (AS) and seven of autism. In addition to this
diagnostic information, we used the Autism Diagnostic Observa-
tional Schedule [27] to further characterize the current profile of
the participants (see Table 1): 11 participants scored above ADOS
cut-off for autism, 4 scored above ADOS cut-off for ASD, 3 scored
above cut-off in only one of the two subscales, no participant was
below cut-off in both subscales (see Appendix S1). Omitting the 3
participants whose total ADOS score fell below cut-off for ASD
did not alter the results, and data are reported below for all 18
participants in the ASD group. The TD controls were recruited in
mainstream schools and had no identified special needs.
Stimuli
The drawings were chosen from a collection of children’s self-
portraits (line drawings in black on a white background) to include
drawings of poor, medium and high quality. We then asked 10
adult participants to rate this collection of 29 drawings on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) and
selected the thirteen drawings that elicited the strongest levels of
agreement. Four drawings were included in the ‘poor quality’
category, five in the ‘medium quality’ category, and four in the
‘high quality’ category. The scale used for children combined
verbal, graphic and numerical cues (see Figure 1).
The pleasure scale for children
The pleasure scale is a validated instrument used to assess
anhedonia in children [28]. It consists of 39 items pertaining to
physical, social, or other sources of pleasure (see (1–3) for an
example in each category and [28] for a complete list).
1. You are cycling down the street very fast while still in good
control of yourself.
2. You accidentally overhear your teacher telling the principal
what a terrific student you are.
Table 1. Participants’ mean age, IQ and ADOS-G scores in the
ASD group.
ASD TD t(df) value, p value
mean age 6 sd 13;860;10 13;1160;10 t(34)=20.95, p=.35
Age range 12;4–15;1 12;10–15;9
mean IQ 6 sd 102615 103614 t(34)=0.30, p=.77
mean ADOS 6 sd 11.264.3 NA
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031107.t001
Figure 1. Seven-point Likert scale used to guide children’s
ratings and one example of a drawing of poor, medium and
high quality (from left to right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031107.g001
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you want.
The child is read each item out loud and asked to rate the
situation on a 3-point Likert scale: 1 for ‘Very happy’, 2 for
‘Happy’ and 3 for ‘Neither happy nor unhappy’. Thus, high scores
reflect diminished pleasurable responses (or increased anhedonia).
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet room. Two
experimenters (E1 and E2) were involved in the procedure. Whilst
E2 was waiting outside the testing room, E1 introduced the child
to the scale and presented three practice drawings. In the test
phase, E1 asked the child to rate the remaining ten drawings one
by one. E1 then placed two of the drawings for which the child
had provided a medium rating at the bottom of the stack and left
the room declaring that the experiment was over and that E2
would now come to do a few more things with the child. The two
drawings placed at the bottom of the stack were the ones which the
child would have to rate again and were chosen in the middle
range in order to allow children to flexibly increase or decrease
their scores.
E2 came in the room and asked the child what he had been up
to with E1. Upon his response, E1 took the pile of drawings and
declared: ‘Oh, so you were ratings these drawings, that’s
interesting!’, whilst casually looking through the pile. When E1
got to the penultimate and last drawing, she asked the child for a
second rating. In the control condition, she would simply say: ‘So
how much do you think this one should get?’. In the experimental
condition, she would say: ‘Oh, that’s my drawing! How much do
you think this one should get?’ The order of the control and
experimental rating was counterbalanced across participants. E2
then went on presenting an unrelated task (WASI), filled out the
pleasure scale and debriefed the children.
Data analysis
The data were analysed using Statistica 7.0. Shapiro Wilk tests
revealed that the data were not normally distributed. Non
parametric statistics were therefore used throughout the analyses.
All p values assume two-tailed tests.
Results
We first checked whether the two groups differed in their overall
appreciation of the drawings by comparing their average first
ratings to all ten drawings. We found that the ASD group and the
TD group gave comparable ratings, U=115.0, Z=1.49, p=.14,
Mann-Whitney U Test, which suggests that neither group was
harsher or more generous overall than the other (see Table 2).
The crucial dependent variable was the difference score
between the first and the second rating for both Drawing types
(Control vs. Experimental). In the Control condition, both groups
kept their rating constant, and the difference score did not differ
from zero, ZASD=1.01, p=.31; ZTD=0.06, p=.95, one-sample
Wilcoxon signed rank test. In the Experimental condition,
however, the difference score did not differ from zero in the
ASD group, Z=0.38, p=.71, but did in the TD group, Z=3.47,
p=.0005, one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank test (see Figure 2 and
Table 2).
Between-group comparisons further revealed that both groups
were comparable in the Control condition, U=138.5, Z=2.82,
p=.41; but that the TD group had significantly larger difference
scores in the Experimental condition than the ASD group,
U=102.0, Z=21.94, p=.05, Mann-Whitney U Test (see Figure 2
and Table 2).
Finally, the comparison between the difference score for the
Experimental drawing was significantly larger than for the control
drawing in the TD group, but not in the ASD group: TD group,
Z=2.73, p=.006, ASD Z=0.51, p=.61, Wilcoxon matched pairs
test (see Figure 2 and Table 2).
In line with our predictions, across all participants the social
sub-score of the pleasure scale was significantly negatively
correlated with the difference score in the experimental condition:
the higher the score in social anhedonia, the lower the score in
flattery (see Table 3). In other words, social enjoyment was
associated with increased flattery behaviour. This was confirmed
when both groups were considered separately, with a significant
correlation in the ASD group, and a similar trend in the TD group
(see Table 3). By contrast, the other two sub-scores were not
associated with flattery.
Discussion
In this paper, we used ASD as a model to explore the
relationship between social motivation and flattery. Participants
first rated a set of pictures and were then given the opportunity to
inflate their initial ratings in front of an experimenter who
declared that she had drawn the picture. In line with our
predictions, we demonstrated that children with an ASD did not
enhance their ratings in the presence of the drawer: There was no
significant difference between their initial rating and their second
rating, and the resulting difference score was similar to that
obtained in the control condition (judging a picture in the artist’s
absence). In the TD group, by contrast, children increased their
ratings by about one point in the experimental condition: the
difference score in this condition differed significantly from zero,
from the control condition, and from the Difference Score
obtained in the ASD group. Using an anhedonia scale, we further
Table 2. Descriptive statistics in the ASD and TD groups for all variables of interest (First rating, Difference score for the control
drawing and Difference score for the experimental drawing).
median (min – max) mean ± sd 95% confidence
ASD First Ratings 4.15 (3.00–5.10) 4.0660.64 3.74–4.38
Diff. Score Control 0.00 (21.00–1.00) 20.1760.62 20.47–0.14
Diff. Score Experimental 0.00 (23.00–3.00) 0.1161.71 20.74–0.96
TD First Ratings 3.90 (22.90–4.50) 3.7760.53 3.50–4.03
Diff. Score Control 0.00 (22.00–2.00) 0.0361.09 20.51–0.57
Diff. Score Experimental 1.00 (0.00–2.00) 1.0060.66 0.67–1.33
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031107.t002
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their self-report of enjoyment of social interactions.
Though this is the first direct investigation of the link between
diminished social interest and reputation management, a couple of
recent studies also suggest that autism provides a good model to
understand the processes by which people establish, maintain, and
enhance their relationships with others. In particular, in a study
addressing the understanding and use of self-presentational display
rules, children with ASD were found to be less able to refrain from
expressing their emotions in order to deceive an experimenter
[29]. Similarly, in a study examining the acoustics of laughter
during play interactions, Hudenko et al. demonstrated that
children with autism express laughter primarily in response to
positive internal states rather than for more social purposes [30].
More generally, children with autism are known to share fewer
smiles during social interactions than their TD peers; e.g., [31,32].
These results also fit with clinical and parental accounts that
emphasise the –often blunt– honesty with which individuals with
autism express their opinions. Kanner’s initial description of the
disorder [33], for instance, included a number of statements about
his patients’ disregard for others’ opinion (e.g., his notes about case
5: ‘‘No competitive spirit, no desire to please her teacher. If she
knew more than any member in the class about something, she
would give no hint of it, just keep quiet, maybe not even listen’’). In
a self-help book written by a mother of a child with Asperger
syndrome (AS), reputation management is also mentioned as an
area of special challenge and parents are encouraged to appreciate
their child’s honesty as a special attribute: ‘‘Often the ‘rude’
behaviour of a child with AS is really just honest behaviour.
Honesty and directness are very much a part of Asperger (…).
Looked at it positively, it’s very rare and refreshing to come across
the lack of hypocrisy and pretence which is so typical with AS’’
[34].
The question of what accounts for diminished concern for
reputation in ASD is, however, unresolved. Individuals with
autism may indeed fail to flatter others because they lack the
ability to empathize with others’ emotions or to appreciate that a
negative rating might elicit negative emotions in the recipient.
Such a mentalistic interpretation was recently put forward in a
study revealing that adults with the condition are not influenced by
the presence of an observer when asked to make a charitable
donation [35]. According to Izuma et al., this absence of audience
effects in autism points to a specific deficit in taking into account
one’s reputation in the eyes of others. In a recent review on the topic,
Tennie, Frith and Frith [36] also suggested that mastery of
reputation management strategies derives from ToM.
But does mentalizing suffice to sustain efficient reputation
management? Conceptually, it appears that both mechanisms are
relatively distinct: One might indeed have a good understanding of
others’ mental states yet no interest in putting this knowledge to
use to optimize social relationships. Whether or not people use the
output of mentalizing cognitive modules to enhance their image is
indeed likely to depend on individual psychological differences
(i.e., one’s general concern for others’ opinion and social approval)
and the specific circumstances of the interaction (e.g., how much
one cares about a particular person’s opinion). As a consequence,
understanding what others want and expect might end up being of
little use without the basic drive to act in accordance with these
desires and expectations. If it appears that mentalizing is not
sufficient to account for reputation management, the next question
is whether it is at all necessary. Animal research suggests that the
answer to this question is not straightforward. Several examples of
audience effects and tactical deception have indeed been reported
among reef fish, a species which is arguably not equipped with
higher cognitive modules such as ToM; for a short review, see
[36]. However, whether reputation in human and non human
animals relies on the same mechanisms remains unknown. One
could indeed imagine that humans, being especially apt at
mentalizing, spontaneously put these skills to the service of
reputation management.
In autism then, it remains unclear whether deficits in reputation
management result from 1) impaired ToM, 2) diminished social
motivation, or 3) a combination of both. In the present study, the
correlation between social anhedonia and flattery behaviour can
be seen as a first step in exploring the social motivation hypothesis
and echoes classic findings showing that individuals scoring high in
Table 3. Correlations between the difference score in the experimental condition and social, physical and other sources of
pleasure.
Social pleasure Physical pleasure Other sources of pleasure
mean ± sd r mean ± sd r mean ± sd r
All participants 34.767.2 20.53** 14.562.6 20.09 20.763.8 20.27
ASD 36.668.3 20.52* 14.262.4 20.18 20.264.1 20.43,
TD 32.965.6 20.42, 14.762.8 0.07 21.263.6 0.01
*Indicates p values#.05,
**indicates p values#.01,
,indicates p values#.10.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031107.t003
Figure 2. Difference scores in the Control and Experimental
conditions for the ASD (light grey) and the TD group (dark
grey). Mean and SEM are depicted. * indicates p values#.05, ** indi-
cates p values#.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031107.g002
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However, due to its correlational nature, this finding is to be
interpreted with caution, and the methods used in the current
study do not provide a definite way of supporting one
interpretation over the other. Another limitation of our study is
that our sample consisted of boys only, which precludes
investigating possible gender differences in the development of
reputation management. This caveat is particularly important to
highlight given that females have been shown to score higher in
some social questionnaires, such as the empathy quotient [38].
Despite these limitations, these findings raise the exciting
question of how much inter-individual differences in social interest
play a role in social skills. In the present study, the correlation
between social anhedonia and flattery behaviour can be seen as a
first step in exploring this issue. However, a more systematic
investigation of the modulating influence of social interest on
behaviours aimed at making oneself noticed, valued, and accepted
remains to be carried out. Indeed, although there are good
evolutionary reasons to posit that the drive to have good social
relationships is universal, this ‘need to belong’ [39] is likely to vary
in the general population (just like height, intelligence, or verbal
fluency). Autism can thus be seen as the extreme end of a
continuum ranging from low to high need to belong –an extreme
case of diminished social interest [17,40]– and can therefore
function as an insightful model to understand humans’ deep-seated
drive to seek acceptance and avoid rejection.
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Appendix S1 Individual diagnostic information in the ASD
group. Diagnosis refers to the clinical assessment provided by a
psychologist or psychiatrist as recorded on school files. Scores on
the ADOS-G are derived from the diagnostic algorithm and
represent the current profile of the participant. Cut-off points for
autism and ASD are set at 10 and 7 respectively for the total score,
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interaction subscale. This table also presents individual difference
scores in the experimental condition.
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